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Can tax policies be designed to encourage  Data from 31 African countries show the
economic growth in developing countries?  One  medium- and long-term effects of fiscal policies
view holds that by providing the govemment  on growth during 1965-73 and 1974-82. Gov-
with a stable source of funding and reducing the  emment investments for the earlier period were
current account deficit, tax revenues encourage  sufficiently productive to justify the distortions
long-term growth.  In this view, the economic  imposed by the relatively high tax rates neces-
distortions aggravated by tax rates are slight in  sary to finance them.  By 1974-82, however, the
comparison to such institutional constraints as  return on govenmment  investments had fallen to
price controls, foreign exchange allocations, and  almost zero, suggesting that the burden of
trade quotas.  personal and corporate taxes led to a contraction
in growth.  Although taxes on imports did not
The other view is that high marginal tax  affect out-ut directly, such taxes reduce invest-
rates constrain long-temi economic development  ment and thereby indirectly curtail grwth.  On
by discouraging business expansion, investment,  balance, sales and excise taxes had the most
and foreign trade.  The contention is that the  moderate effects on growth and investment.
benefits of a carefully designed, moderate tax
structure exceed the costs of budget deficits or  In sum, a balanced increase in govenmment
spending cuts.  spending financed by sales and excise taxes, or
by a shift from personal and corporate taxes to
This paper tests these v:.ews  by measuring  consumption taxes, can increase growth rates.
the effect of government spending and taxation
on output growth.  In theory, higher tax rates  This paper is a product of the Public Eco-
shift investment and employment to sectors with  nomics Division, Country Economics Depart-
low - or even negative - tax rates, such as  ment.  Copies are available free from the World
import-substitution or underground sectors. The  Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC
lower returns to investment and labor in these  20433. Please contact Ann Bhalla, room N10-
sectors mean that the economy wiU generally  077, extension 60359.
record lower growth rates.
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What is the appropriate role of tax policy for encouraging
economic  growth  in  developing  countries? One  view is thit  tax  hikes  reduce
current  account  deficits  and  ease  budgetary  pressures,  thereby  encouraging
investment  and long-term growth.  In this view, it is less important
whether  trade,  personal,  or excise  taxes  are  used to raise  revenue,  since
the effect  of tax-induced  distortions  are thought  to be small  relative  to
institutional  constraints such as price controls, foreign exchange
allocations,  and trade  quotas.
An opposing  view is that  high marginal  tax rates  discourage  work
effort,  squelch  new investment,  limit  foreign  trade,  and  thereby  present  a
major  hurdle  to economic  development. The  long-run  benefits  of low  rates,
or at least  a carefully  designed  tax structure,  are thought  to offset  the
disadvantage  of temporary  budget  deficits  (or  expenditure  cutbacks),  and  to
provide  the developing  country  with the necessary  and perhaps  sufficient
environment  to stimulate  economic  growth.
This paper  tests these competing  hypotheses in a model that
measures the effect of taxation and government  expenditures  on output
growth.  Previous  studies  have developed,  and estimated,  models  of output
growth and government  expenditure  alone (Ram,  1986),  or calculated  the
impact of tax distortions  in general  equilibrium  models (deMelo,  1978;
Taylor  and Black,  1974;  Clarete  and Whalley,  1987;  Henderson,  1982).  The
model  presented  below  provides  an integrated  framework  in  which  the impact
on GDP growth  rates  of government  expenditures,  public  and  private  capital
accumulation,  and sectoral  tax distortions  are derived  in a theoretical2-
model,  and estimated  using pooled  cross-section  time-series  data for sub-
Sahara  Africa  during  1965-82.
Any study  which  attempts  to  relate  government  fiscal  policies  with
output  growth  rates  must confront  the theoretical  problem  that  while  taxes
and  an inefficient  government  sector  may  reduce  the  level  of  GDP, it i.  not
clear that the rate of growth  of GDP should  be affected.  Lucas (1985),
and  Manas-Anton  (1985)  have emphasized  that  taxation  and (most)  government
policy  will have no effect  on long-term  growth  rates.  The first  question
to  be addressed,  then,  is  why  should  tax  rates  affect  output  growth  rates?
The answer  is that static  tax  distortions  do affect  output  growth
along  a transition pa.. --  or a sequenced change in the level of output --
by encouraging  the flow  of investment  and labor  se  into  sectors  which
largely  escape  taxation.  The expansion  of these  liv&.-Iy  taxed (or  even
subsidized)  sectors  will  lead to  lower overall  capital and labor
productivity.  Hence for a given rate of investment  and ]4bor supply
grow..h,  output  growth  is likely  to  decline. Alternatively,  if the  lightly-
taxed  sectors  provide  positive  benefits  (e.g.,  export-ori.ented  industries),
then taxes which direct more resources into these socially  productive
activities  can  augment  output  growtn  rates. If  the  economy  is  on a steady-
state  growth  path,  taxation  will  have  no effect. Ultimately,  the  effect  of
taxation  on output  growth  is  an empirical  question.
While Landau (1983,  1986)  has found  an often  negative  impact  of
the  level of government spending on growth rates, Ram  (1986) has
emphasized that the change in government  spending  is the theoretically
correct  factor  in explaining  a change  in output. Regressions  which  follow
Ram's  formulation indicate that during the period 1965-73, the high-3-
marginal  return  from  government  investment more  than  offset  the
distortionary  costs  of taxation.  During  the sharp  economic  downturns  of
1974-82, however,  the  regression  coefficients  suggest that public
investment  did not contribute  to GDP growth;  a tax-financed  increase  in
government investment  equal to 5 percent of GDP is predicted to have
reduced  output  growth  by nearly  0.6  percentage  points. The  productivity  of
private  investment  remained  relatively  constant  during  both  periods.
The average increase in tax effort  by the Sub-saharan  African
countries  between  1965-73  and  1974-82  is predicted  to have reduced  output
growth,  even after accounting  for the positive  effects  of the additional
government spending.  However, this is not  to suggest that all tax
instruments  are  equally  inefficient.  Personal  and  corporate  tax  rates,  for
example,  are estimated  to  have a significant  and  negative  direct  effect  on
output  growth. Trade  taxes  have little  direct  effect  on output  growth  --
holding  private  investment  constant  --  but they are predicted  to reduce
investment  and thereby  indirectly  attenuate  output  growth  rates.  Finally,
sales  and  excise  taxes  did not  have a significant  impact  on output  growth
or investment. These results  have two implications. The first is that
government  expenditures  financed  by sales or excise  taxation  can have a
positive  effect  on output  growth.  The second  is that a revenue-neutral
shift  from  trade  and  direct  taxes  to sales  or excise  taxation  may increase
output  growth  rates. 1
The traditional  view of direct  versus  indirect  taxation  is that
direct  taxes  creates dynamic  distortions by  reducing  savings  and
investment,  while indirect taxation leads to static distortions. The
results presented below suggest a different  view.  Direct taxes are
j/ This model cannot assess the distributional  impact of such a  tax
change.-4
estimated  to cause  a "static"  distortion,  while trade  taxes  are predicted
to reduce  investment. These  results  can be explained  in part by noting
that developing countries often concentrate  direct taxation  on a very
limited  number of large-"'ale  firms (such  as those in manufacturing  and
mining);  if in turn these  taxes  are  passed  along  to the output  price (as
suggested  by Brent,  1985),  the  direct  tax  could  resemble  a "static"  excise
tax.  Similarly,  companies  may be discouraged  from investing  because  of
heavy export  taxes on processed  outputs,  or the taxation  of intermediate
imports.
The remainder  of the paper is organized  in the following  way.
Section  II discusses  previous  studies  of tax distortions,  shortcomings  of
cross-country  regression  models,  and  the  econometric  growth  model.  Section
III presents the regression  results, while Section IV concludes.  An
appendix  is also  provided  which  discusses  aspects  of the  theoretical  model
in  more detail.
II.  The  Thooretical  Model
It is useful  to review  three  approaches  to the issue  of how tax
policy affects output growth.  The first Adopts  a neoclassical  growth
model,  most  commonly  with a  single good and with  infinitely-lived
individuals  (Lucas,  1985;  MAnas-Anton,  1985).  In such  a model,  taxes  have
no effect  on output  growth  in  the  long-run  since  steady-state  output  growth
is determined  by  exogenous  factors such  as population  growth and
technological  change.
During  the  transition  path  between  the  two  steady-state
equilibria,  growth  rates will be affected.  Lucas (1985)  suggests  that
"static" tax distortions  might account for only 0.5 percentage  point-5-
differences  in growth rates along the transition  path.  However,  a 0.5
percentage  point  jump in annual  growth  rates  would  have represented  a '
percent improvement  over the (unweighted)  average  real per capita  growth
rates  in  Sub-saharan  Africa  during  1974-82.
There  is little -P son to believe that African  (or other)
countries are in steady-at,  equilibrium.  Only 5 Sub-saharan  African
countries  had achieved  independence  before  1960,  and regime  changes  will
presumably  lead to differing  growth  paths.  Furthermore,  the transition
path is lengthy; the "grand traverse" of tre-  U.S. from a low capital
intensity  to a  high  capital  intensity  economy  took  most  of the  19th  century
(David,  1977).2  A model  which allows  for the possibility  of transition
paths  seems  appropriate  for  the  analysis  of developing  economies.
A  second  approach  uses  computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  models
of specific  countries  to test  the  effect  of static  tariff  or sectoral  tax
inefficiencies. 3 These  mddels  compare  the  output  (or income  distribution)
of an economy using baseline parameters with  the outcome using the
counterfactual  alternative  policy  parameters.  One  drawback  of these  models
is  that  parameters  necessary  for  policy  recommendations,  such  as the  impact
of government  spending  and investment  on sectoral  output,  are not always
estimable.  The  dynamic  specification  of these  simulation  models  presents  a
particular  problem  (see  Chamley,  1983).
The third  approach  compares  tax  policy  and  country  growth  rates  in
cross-section  empirical  analysis. For example,  Marsden  (1983)  matched  ten
high-tax  countries,  such  as Zambia,  Britain,  Chile,  and  Zaire,  with  10 low-
/  Life  cycle  simulation  models  also  suggest  a trasition  path  in excess  of
30  years  (Auerbach,  Kotlikoff,  and  Skinner,  1983;  Seidman,  1984).
.i.  For  example,  see  Henderson  (1982),  Taylor  and  Black  (1974),  Clarets  and
Whalley (1987),  and DeMelo  (1978)  for simulation  models  of developing
countries.-6-
tax countries  such as Singapore,  Korea,  Uruguay,  and  Japan.  He found  in
comparing  the 20 countries  that higher overall  tax effort led to lower
output growth.  Two disadvantages  with this study are the lack of an
underlying theoretical model, and  the subjective procedure by which
countries  are  matched  together.
A number  of studies  have  used  cross-country  regressions  to  measure
the impact of government  expenditures  and taxation on output growth.
Martin  (n.d.)  foun4  that  while  tax  effort  (the  ratio  of tax  revenue  to  GDP)
depressed  output  growth,  deficits  reduced  it  by even  more,  suggesting  that
tax  hikes  could,  by cutting  back  deficits,  encourage  output  growth  rates. 4
*He  also found that income/corporate  and trade/indirect  taxes (defined  as
ratios  of the  specific  tax  revenue  to GDP)  reduced  output  growth.
Koester  and  Kormendi  (1988)  calculated  marginal  tax  rates  for  each
of their  sample  of 63 countries  by comparing  the  year-to-year  fluctuation
of tax  revenue  with the  year-to-year  change  in  GDP.  The  marginal  tax  rate
(conditional  on average  tax  effort)  had little  impact  on growth  rates  in a
cross-sectional  analysis,  but it did  have a  strong  negative  effect  on the
level  of output.
Landau (1983,1986)  performed  extensive  cross-country  regressions
to measure  the  impact  of government  expenditures,  revenue,  and  deficits  on
output  growth. Most components  of government  spending  reduced  GDP growth
rates;  in addition,  Landau  (1986)  found  evidence  that  taxes  reduced  output
growth  and crowded out private  investment.  The question  remains  why a
4/  The direction of causality between deficits and output growth is
problematic. Countries  often run deficits  during  economic  downturns
and surpluses  during  economic  booms.  In this view, low GDP growth
rates  cause  deficits,  and  not  conversely.-7-
large and inefficient  government sector should necessarily  affect the
growth  rate,  rathar  than  simply  the  level,  of GDP?
To address  this theoretical  difficulty,  Ram (1986)  derived  an
expression  for output  growth  as a function  of growth  rates  in government
spending.  He  found a  strong, positive impact of government  current
consumption  on  output  growth. The  goal  of this  section  is to  build  on  work
by Robinson  (1971),  Feder  (1983),  and  Ram (1986),  to develop  a theoretical
framework  for measuring  the impact  of taxation,  government  expenditures,
capital,  and  labor  supply  on output  growth.
Before  deriving  the  model,  it  is useful  to review  some
shortcomings  of cross-country  regression  analysis. The  usual  criticism  of
these  comparisons  is that countries  are suff'ciently  dissimilar  that they
cannot  be pooled  together  in a single  data set; it makes little  sense  to
interpret  regression  estimates  based on,  e.g.,  France  and Burundi. While
this  paper  restricts  its  attention  to Sub-saharan  Africa,  the  criticism  is
a general one for all regressions --  do the observations,  whether  of
individuals,  countries,  or years,  behave  according  to a similar  structural
model? If  yes,  then  the  reported  regression  results  will  provide  estimates
of the  average,  or representative  parameters  values. If  not, the  diversity
should  be readily  reflected  in insignificant  regression  coefficients  (also
see  Landau,  1986).
A second problem with any regression  is the possibility  that
measured  independent  variables  proxy  for the  true,  but unmeasured,  factors
which  determine  output  growth.  For example,  countries  with large  mining
sectors  often rely heavily  on corporate  taxation. Downturns  suffered  by
some mining  industries during 1974-82 could therefore  have led to a
measured,  but spurious,  negative  effect of corporate  taxation  on output
growth.  To correct  at least  partially  for this problem,  the regressions-8-
include non-government variables which affect output growth, such as
whether  the  country  produces  oil  or  mining  outputs.
An additional  problem  is the  proper  measuremen,  of effective  tax
rates.  Developing  countries  often rely on non-tax  constraints  such as
industrial licenses, foreign-exchange  and price controls, quotas, and
marketing  boards,  all  of  iwhich  can  be reflected  in standard  measures  of tax
rater.  If the measured  tax rates are not binding,  then the regression
results  will indicate  little  or no role for these  measured  tax rates in
determin'ng  output  growth.
The  most  serious  shortcoming  of cross-country  regre  'in  models  is
the potential  endogeneity  of the independent  variables.  Rapidly-growing
c.untries may  also experience high investment rates and government
spending. For  example,  Ram's  positive  coefficient  of government  growth  on
output growth could be explained simply  by the finding that expanding
countries invest heavily in government services.  While  the  9-year
accounting  framework  adopted  by this  paper  corrects  in part for short-run
endogeneity in the independent variables, correcting for longer-term
endogeneity  is  problematic. 5
To simplify  the  theoretical  analysis,  I assume  that the  output  of
the economy is comprised  of an untaxed (or, more generally,  a lightly-
taxed)  sector  and a taxed  sector.  For example,  the untaxed  sector  might
include  services, small-scale production, the  informal sector, and
5/  Ram (1986b)  argues  on empirical  grounds  that there  is little  evidence
in favor of government spending endogeneity.  On the other hand,
Laundau  has attempted  to control  for the endogeneity  problem  by using
lagged values of the suspected endogenous  variables.  However, Q
regression  coefficients  on lagged  endogenous  variables  (essentially  VAR
coefficients)  are  fine  for prediction, but  have no  structural
interpretation.  For a simultaneous  equations model of government
spending  and  output  growth,  see  Engen  and  Skinner  (1988).-9-
smallholder  agriculture. The government  sector  '  8  included  in the  untaxed
sector  ecause  the payroll  taxes assessed  on government  wages are simply
returned  to the government,  so the government  pays only net wages.  The
taxed  sector  includes  large-scale  manufacturing  and  export  industries.  In
many countries,  the  distinction  between  the two  sectors  is  not sharp. The
smallholder  agricultural  sector, for example,  will escape the payroll
(i.e.,  personal)  and corporate  tax,  but the  marketing  board  may impose  an
implicit  output  tax  by paying  farmers  less  than  world  prices.
Let  the  taxed  sector  be x, and the  untaxed  n.  Output  (or  GDP)  is
written
y 'PnQn  +  PxQx  (1)
where  Pn  and  Px are  the  (fixed)  prices  to  retailers  or consumers  in the
untaxed  and  taxed  sectors,  respectively,  and  Qn and  Qx are  the  equivalent
quantities  produced  in  each  sector.
Value  added  in each  sector  is affected  by government  investments  in
infrastructure  and other  projects,  and by government  spending  for current
services.  Let output  in each sector  be a function  of these government
acti.vities,  plus  private  inputs;
Qn  - F(Kn  L  n,Kg,G)  (2)
Qx-  H(K ,L  ,K  ,G)
where  Kn and  Kx represent  private  capital  in  the  untaxed  and  taxed  sector,
Ln and  Lx measure  labor  in  each  sector,  Kg  measures  public  capital,  and  G
is  ciwrrent  government  consumption  (excluding  debt  repayment).  Total
capital  is  KT  - Kx +  Kn + Kg ,  while  total  labor  supply  is  L - Ln  +  Lx.- 10
As discussed  by Ram (1986),  G is included  in  both  sectors  owing  to  possible
external  effects  of government  activity. Additionally,  government  capital,
which appears  as a "public  good" in each  production  function,  may affect
output  differentl)  from  private  capital.
Many developing  countries  rely  heavily  on commodity  taxes  such  as
import,  export,  and sales taxation. The primary  impact  of each of these
taxes  is to drive  a "wedge"  between  the  producer  price  and consumer  price
of the  output. In the  case  of  sales  or excise  taxes,  the  tix  would  usually
affect  domestically  produced  goods,  while  export  taxes  would  affect  large-
scale  exports.  Import  taxes  might  provide  a subsidy  for  domestic  import-
substituting  industries,  and thereby  draw resources  away from uses with
higher  social  rates of return.  For the purpose  of the two-sector  model
presented  below,  ass'ime  that  a single  commodity  tax,  ty, is imposed  on the
tax  sector.
Output taxes can be shifted forward,  through higher consumer
prices,  or shifted  backwards,  through  a reduction  in wages and interest
rates.  If the GDP price deflator  is calculated  properly,  the consumer
price  distortion  (or  forward-shifting)  of an excise  tax  should  reduce  GDP,
since the value of the distorted consumption  bundle, evaluated  at the
original factor prices,  is l.ss than the value  of  the undistorted
consumption  bundle.  This theoretical  section  focuses  more on production
distortions  caused  by backward-shifted  taxes,  but the  empirical  estimation
procedure is perfectly general whether the tax is forward-shifted  or
backward-shifted.  The regression  coefficients  measure  the  combined  impact
of the  tax  on output  growth  in  constant  prices.
Direct  taxes  such  as the  corporate  and  income  tax  will  also  affect
the allncation  of investment  and labor supply.  The income tax is acombination  of a  payroll  tax  on  wages  and  an interest  income  tax,  while  the
corporate  tax is imposed  only on corporate  accounting  profits,  and hence
falls (nominally)  on capital.  In combination,  these two taxes drive
varying  degrees  of "wedges"  between the gross and net interest  rate and
wage rate.  Like the output  tax ty,  the  tax  on capital,  tk  and the tax  on
labor,  t1 may be shifted  back onto  wages and interest  rates,  or forward
onto  higher  consumer  prices  for  the  outputs. There  is  a strong  equivalence
between  the  two  taxes;  the  combined  tax  wedge  between  the  net  and  gross
return on capital is  rk - 1 - (l-ty)(l-tk)  and for labor, 'l  - 1 -
(l-ty)(1-tl).  That  is,  a 10 percent  commodity  tax  has the  same  effect  on
incentives  as a 10  percent  tax  on  capital  and  labor  (if  there  are  profits,
the  commodity  tax  will raise  more  revenue). In  the  model  below,  the
"capital"  tax  rk and  the  "labor"  tax  rl  are  used  to summarize  the  combined
distortions  of direct  and  indirect  taxes,  although  in  the  empirical
section,  each  tax  instrument  will  be entered  separately.
Assume  that  total  (privato)  capital  K - Kn  +  Kx and labor  L - Ln
+  Lx  are  in fixed  supply,  but the  share  of the  input  in  each  sector
deipends  on the  vector  of taxes  r  - (rk,fl);




where k(r)  and  pl(r)  are  the  shares  of K and  L, respectively,  in the
untaxed sector. Next,  a linear  approximation  of equation  (1)  is taken  to
derive a measure explain output growth.  With the difference  operator- 12  -
denoted  by A, and  prices  Pn and Px set  to 1.0  without  loss  of generality,
the  change  in  output  is  written
Ay - Pk(r)AK  +  p1(r)AL +  .4AKg  +  'gAG  (4)
and
f-k(r)  -k(r)Fk  +  (l-Pk(r))Hk
L1(r)  pl(r)Fl +  (1-l(r))H
,yr-  Fp +  Hr
- F  + H g  g
where  Fi and  Hi,  J-k,l,x,g  are  production  function  derivatives  with
respect  to  the  four  inputs: private  capital,  labor,  government  capital,
and  government  consumption.  The interpretation  of each  coefficient  is
straightforward.  The  parameter  -.  measures  the  combined  shift  in  output  of
both sectors  caw  ed  by a one-unit  increase  in the  stock  of  government
capital. Similarly, g measures  the  combined  or "externality"  effect  on
sectoral  output  of government  consumption  (e.g.,  government  services).
The  parameters  Pk and 1l  measure  the  average  of the  gross  (or
social  marginal  factor  productivity  of capital  and  labor,  weighted  by the
input  shares  in the  untaxed  and  taxed  sectors. Rearranging  Pk and  P1
and  differentiating  with respect  to r  yields:
k(r) - 8k(;)  +  (Fk-Hk)[dpk/drJ(v-)  (5)
- )  1(v)  +  (Fl-Hl)[dpl/dr](r-;)- 13  -
where  ; is the  average,  or representative  tax  vector  for  the  country  sample,
and  dpk(r)/dr  and  dpl(r)/dr  are  2xl  matrices  measuring  the (linear)  impact
of the  country-specific  tax  vector  r  on the  share  of  capital,  and  of labor,
in the  untaxed  sector. That is,  each  country-specific  coefficient  Pk and
1l  consists  of a  measure  of  marginal  productivity  B(;) which  is  common  to
all  countries,  plus an  addition  term  which  measu.it=  the  tax-induced  effects
on aggregate  marginal  productivity.  This  second  term  has  a straightforward
interpretation:  the change  in the share of aggregate  capital and labor
changes  flowing  into the  untaxed  sector,  times  the  difference  in marginal
productivity  of the untaxed  versus  the taxed sector.  For example,  if a
heavy  capital  tax  caused  the  share  of new capital  in the taxed  sector  to
fall  by 5 percent,  overall  capital  productivity  would change  by 5 percent
times the difference  between the marginal  returns in the two sectors.
Since  the  n  after-tax  return  will tend towards  equilization,  in general
Hk  >  Fk,  and  H1 > F1. The "own  price"  effect  of a tax  on capital  or labor
is to reduce  its  share  in the taxed  sector,  so that  apk/afk,  apl/al >  0.
Hence  from (5), increasing  rk or '1 reduces  the marginal  productivity  of
capital  or labor.
While  I have  argued above  that the difference in marginal
productivity,  Fk - Hk,  and  F1 - H1, are  negative,  the  existence  of external
or "spillover"  effects  in the  untaxed  sector  could  cause  this  difference  to
be positive (Feder,  1982).  Given that the sectors  most often  viewed  as
providing "spillover"  externalities,  such as manufacturing  and export
industries,  are  generally  in the  taxed  sector,  a more  plausable  story  might
suggest  that  external  effects  exacerbate  the  existing  tax  distortion.
The growth equation presented  above is also consistent  with a
neoclassical  growth  model  in the  steady state.  Given  a  constant-14 
proportional  growth  rate in capital  and labor equal of 0, the appendix
demonstrates that the proportional.  growth rate of output will be 0,
regardless  of the  structure  of taxes.
Dividing  through  by Y, and  rearranging,  yields  the  following
expression  for  the  rate  of growth  in  GDP,  Y,
Y - PO+  Pk(r)[Ip/Y]  + pl(T)L  +  7  ,[Ig/Y]  + -t  [G/Y]G  (6)
where  proportional  changes  are  denoted  x - Ax/x,  x - Y,L,G,  P  measures
unbiased  productivity  change  and  other  factors,  private  investment
In  - AK,  government  investment  Ig  - AKg,  01  - ~1(L/Y),  the  overall  output
elasticity  with  respect  to  labor,  and  Pk,  7x,  and  7g retain  their  original
definition since  they  are  unit-free.
The next step is to specify  how tax rates  enter the estimation
equation.  Substituting  from  (5)  into (6),  and  defining
6kj  (Fk-Hk)aN/arJ  (7)
1j  [L/Y](Fl-H  J  )afl]  /Trj,  j  - k,l
the  econometric  specification  becomes
o+  [k  6kkrk  + 6kl  l 1 (p(/Y)  + [Al  + 'lkrk  + 611rl]t
+  7Y (Ig/Y)  + 7g(G/Y)d  (8)-
with the  coefficients  Pk  and  A1 reflecting  the  interactive  terms
involving r;  i - i(;  6ikrk  il;l' i-k,l.- 15 -
The  theoretical  model  implies  that  individual  tax  rates  enter
interactively  with (Ip/Y),  and  with  L, in  the  output  growth  equation.
However,  with a large  number  of tax  rates,  and  possible  errors  in
measurement  for  I.,  L, and  the  effective  tax  rates,  it  may  also  be useful
to  consolidate  the  interactive  tax  terms  into  a linear  expression,  either
for  each  individual  tax  rate,  or for  an overall  measure  of the  tax "burden"
given  by  the  ratio  of tax  revenue  to  GDP;
-PO +  Ak(Iply)  +  Al  L  +  -Yr(1g/Y)  + 79(G/Y)d + fkrk + elrl  (9)
and  0i  - 6ki(Ip/Y)  +  i  L, i-k,l. In the  empirical  section,  the  two  tax
terms  are  further  condensed  into  the  overall  tax  effort.
Finally,  the third  method  of including  taxation  in an output  growth
equation  is  to focus  on the  ne  return  to  factor  inputs. Output  growth  can
be expressoed  as a function  of net factor.returns,  plus the  change  in tax
revenue  R,  written
AR-  HkrkSKX  + Hl1lAL,  +  ry[H  AG  + H  AKJ  (10)
The  first  two  expressions  on the  RHS  are  the  traditional  increases
in tax  revenue  caused  by growth  in capital  and labor  in the  taxed  sector.
The third  expression,  in  brackets,  measures  the  increased  revenue  generated
by positive  externalities  on the  taxed  sector  from  government  activities.
At this point,  we assume  that net wages, or the net return  on
capital,  are  equal  between  the  two  sectors. If workers,  or investors,  are
allowed to choose between the taxed and  the untaxed sectors, their
preference  for  higher  net  wages  or interest  rates  will tend  to drive  such- 16 -
rates in each  sector  to equality. Using the  property  that  Pi - Hi(l-ri),
i-k,l,  substituting  in (10)  and  rearranging  (9),  output  growth  is  expressed
as
Y-0  + #*(r)(I /Y) + #*(r)L + - (I  /Y) + -'  (G/Y)G  +  O(R/Y)R  (11)
where  R - AR/R,  and  the  net factor  returns  are  defined  to  be Pk  - Fk,
*  *  *
p1 - FI(L/Y), ^  - Fi + H,(l-ry), and rg  - Fg + Hg(l-ry).  The
coefficients  with asterisks  measure  the  after-tiax  factor  productivity,
whether  for  private  returns  p: and  B*,  or for  government  "external"
effects  7g  and  ',.  Note  that  the  net  returns  to government  programs  need
only  subtract  the  output  tax  ry,  since  they  do not  affect  the  taxes  paid  on
factors,  Tk and  rl.  A coefficient  S  on the revenue  term is introduced  to
allow for the imperfect linkage between tax collections  and measure'1
"constant  price"  GDP.
Even  net labor  and capital  productivity  are likely  to depend  on
the  tax  vector  r.  Given  a fixed  level  of capital,  a capital  tax  in  sector
x  will reduce the net return on capital when labor is held constant
(although  the problem  becomes  more complicated  when labor is allowed  to
vary;  Harberger,  1962). Hence  a* and  #* remain  functions  of r,  and
interactive  terms  involving  Ip/Y  and  r,  and L  and  r,  are  used in the
empirical  section.  Strictly  speaking,  the  impact  of r on a* and  P* is  a
second-order  effect;  hence squared terms involving  capital  and labor
should also be included  in  the regressions. Empirical  results  which
include  these squared  terms  sharply  reduce  degrees  of freedom,  but have
little  effect  on the  other  coefficient  estimates.-17-
In the next section,  the model is generalized  to include  trade
taxes,  personal  taxes and sales or excise  taxes,  and the derivation  of
appropriate  tax bases is discussed.  Additional  factors  which may have
affected  output  growth  during  the  period  are  also  explored.
III. Emuirical  Implementation  of the  Theoretical  Model
The  assumption  of a two  sector  model  is  an obvious  simplification,
and it is shown  in the appendix  that the  results  derived  above  carry  over
to many sectors.  Corporate  and personal  taxes will likely affect  the
manufacturing  and mining sectors,  while the import tax is expected  to
provide  protection  for  import-substitution  industries.  The  export  tax  will
affect  export  industries,  while  the  sales/excise  tax  may distort  the  use  of
market  goods  versus  home  production.  Each  tax  is entered  separately  in  the
regressions  to  reflect  potentially  different  effects  on output  growth. The
tax  rates  required  for  the  empirical  estimation  are  discussed  as follows.
ImRort Tax:  The most straightforward  tax to calculate  is the
import tax,  defined to be the ratio of import tax revenue to total
imports.  Error may be  involved  measuring  this tax, since imports  for
government  or foreign  aid use may not be taxed,  while non-tax  exchange
constraints  could  lead to unmeasured  "shadow"  tax rates.  The import  tax,
and  the  variables  that  follow  (unless  otherwise  noted),  come from  the  IMF's
Government  Financial  Statistics  and the  World  Bank  World  Tables,  collected
in an integrated  computerized  data  set  in 1986  at the  World  Bank.
Exnlort  Tax:  The export tax is measured  as export  tax revenue
divided  by the export tax base.  It is therefore  an output  tax on the
export  sector.  The measured  tax will likely  be biased downward,  since
marketing  boards  often  collect  an implicit  tax  on exported  agriculture.- 18  -
Coroorate  Tax:  The corporate  tax is expected  to reduce  the  net
return  on capital  in the coporate  sector.  Because  many corporations  are
involved  in manufacturing and exports (e.g., minerals, large-scale
agriculture),  the corporate  tax  base is defined  to be manufacturing  value
added  plus export  sales.  This tax base is a hybrid  of value added (in
manufacturing),  which can proxy for corporate  profits,  and export  sales,
which  may include  the  value  of inputs  purchased  from  other  sectors. (Value
added  in export  industries would  be  a better  measure,  but  it is
unavailable.) There is little  chance  of double counting  the tax base,
since  less  than  4  percent  of  African  manufacturing  is  exported.
Personal Tax:  The personal or individual  tax is typically  a
payroll  tax,  often  for  workers  in larger  establishments,  and  for  government
workers.  Thus the assumed  personal  tax base is the  manufacturing  sector
plus government  consumption  (which  proxies  for the government  wage-bill).
The  tax  base  will  be biased  upward  to  the  extent  that  not  all  manufacturing
is subject  to payroll  tax,  but biased  downward  since  some  -export-oriented
tirms  are  subject  to taxation. 6
Sales  Tax:  The  sales  and  excise  tax  is calculated  as the  ratio  of
sales  and  excise  taxes  to manufacturing value-added plus  imports,
reflecting  the  usual targets  of sales  and  excise  taxes:  imported  goods  and
domestically  manufactured  products.
Ta  Effort: The  tax  effort  is the  average  ratio  of tax  revenue  to
GDP.  Tax  effort  can  proxy for  the  overall  level  of tax  distortion  (as  in
Marsden,  1983).  Alternatively,  a higher  tax effort  holding  marginal  tax
rates  constant  is  consistent  with  a  broader  overall  tax  base.
L/  Y'hile  government  workers  are  assumed  to  be in  the  untaxed  sector  (since
taxes  collected  are  paid back  into the government) the proper
calculatiin  of the  tax  rate  in the  taxed  (private)  sector  requires  that
government-consumption  be included  in the  tax  base.- 19  -
Additional  variables  measuring  the change in output,  government
expenditure,  capital, labor, and other factors, are calculated  in the
following  way:
GDP  Growth  (Y): The  growth  rate  is defined  to  be the  average  log
growth  in GDP  measured  at constant  factor  cost,  or if factor  cost  measures
were unavailable,  at constant  market  prices.  The change in output  was
taken  over a  9-year period  (or 8 or 7  years  if recent data were
unavailable)  1965-73,  or 1974-82.
Weighted  Government  rrowth  (G/Y1G):  This  variable  is  the  share
of  government  consumption  to  GDP  averaged  over  the  9-year  period  (or  7-8
year  period  if  data  were  missing)  multiplied  by G, the  percentage  change  in
government  consumption.  Government  consumption  from  the  national  accounts
does  not include  debt  service,  a  budget  item  with  presumably  little
productive value.  Note that in the empirical section, the weighted
variable  may  be decomposed  into  Government  Consumption,  defined  as [G/Y],
and  Government  Growth,  G.
Private Investment  (Ip/Y):  This measure of the change in the
private  capital  stock  was calculated  by accumulating  the ratio  of annual
private  investment  to GDP  over  the  9-year  period,  depreciated  at a  yearly  8
percent  rate.  Annual  private  investment  was calculated  first  by measuring
A, the  average  ratio  of public  investment  (defined  as total  minus  current
government  expenditures)  to  total  investment  over  the  9-year  period. 7
Private  gross  investment  in  each  year is then  measured  as (1-A)  times  total
gross  investment.  Private  capital  growth  over  the  9-year  period  is  written
Z/  For some countries,  as few as 3 of the 9 years were available  for
calculating  A.  It is therefore  likely  to  be measured  with  some  error.20  -
AK/Y  - E  [(l-A)[V(i)/Y(i)](1.08)  J/9  (12)
i-1
where  V(i) and Y(i) are investment  and GDP in year i. 8 Note that this
procedure  cannot  account  for the loss of existing  capital  stock through
depreciation.
Government  Investment  (M(g/Y): The change  in government  capital
is simply  the  difference  between  accumulated  total  capital  and  accumulated
private  capital,  or A/(1-A)  times  the  LIS of (12).
Labor  Supply  Growth  (L): Population  growth  (denoted  Population)
is  used to  proxy  for  the  change  in labor  supply.
Inflation: The inflation  rate is measured  as the average  annual
growth  rate in the  GDP deflator. This  variable  is used in the  investment
regressions  to proxy for a measure  of real interest  rates.  If nominal
rates are fixed, higher inflation  rates could lead both to lower real
borrowing  costs,  and  higher  returns  to  physical  capital  accumulation.
Other Variables:  It is important to control for as many
additional  non-tax  factors  as possible  that  may affect  the output  of the
economy. For  example,  a sharp  decline  in the  terms-of-trade  will  lead  to -
fall in  real  GDP, independent  of the  tax  system  or of investment  behavior.
The terms  of trade  variables  (expressed  in percentage  terms)  were derived
rom  the  GDP  price  deflators  used  in  the  World  Tables  and  exchange  rates.
Using  the alternative  UN definition of the terms of  trade in the
regressions  did  not  appreciably  affect  the  other  coefficients.
.L There is an alternative  procedure  for calculating  AK/Y, which is to
accumulate  real investment  over the  9-year  period,  and then  divide  by
the  initial  year  GDP.  However,  such  a procedure  introduces
simultaneity  bias, since  even if all  countries  had constant  investment
to GDP ratios,  countries  which happened  to enjoy high growth rates
would also experience  a higehr ratio of accumulated  investment  to
initial GDP, leading to a  spurious correlation between capital
accumulation  and  output  growth.- 21 -
Countries  which  discovered  and  exploited  oil  resources  (The  Congo,
Gabon, Cameroon,  and Nigeria)  are likely  to have enjoyed  higher growth
rates  through  1982,  conditional  on factor  inputs  and tax  policy. Political
instability  can disrupt  economic  growth  both through  the destruction  of
property  and capital,  the flight  of skilled  workers,  and the loss of new
investment  (Schneider  and Frey, 1985; Stewart  and Venieris,  1985).  A
variable  measuring  the number  of "successful"  coups during  the period  is
included (Griffiths,  1984).  Although  coups are potentially  endogenous
(declining  economic  fortanes  spur  coup  attempts),  Wheeler  (1984)  finds  that
political  disruption  Granger-causes  output  changes,  but  not  conversely.  In
the  next  section,  sources  of data  are  described,  and  regression  results  are
reported.
IV.  Egirical Results
The data set described  below will be used to estimate  both the
output growth model  developed in Section III, and also to estimate
investment  demand  equations.  The data come from national  accounts  and
government  financial  statistics.  To abstract  from  short-term  fluctuations,
income  growth  is averaged  over  9 years,  1965-73  and 1974-82.9  The  period
1973-74 represents a significant transition for many countries from
relatively  stable  growth  to uneven  development  as rising  oil prices  and
worldwide  recessions  led to declining  export  prices and increased  debt.
Although  some export  prices  rose later  in the  1970s,  the second  oil  price
increase in 1979-80, subsequent economic slumps, and increasing  debt
burdens  all led to increasing  stress  on government  tax  collection  efforts.
Despite these downturns,  government  investment  during  1974-82  was high
relative to the previous period (Shalizi,  Ghandi, and Ehdaie, 1985).
Overall  tax  effort  increased  for  Sub-saharan  African  countries  during  this
2/  In a few  countries,  1974-81,  growth  rates  were  calculated;  for  Somalia,
1974-79  rates  were  measured.- 22  -
period, although  stepped  up government  expenditures  more than offset the
additional  revenue,  leading  to increased  deficits (Shalizi,  Ghandi,  and
Ehdaie,  1985).
Wheeler  (1984)  used a number  of  variables  to explain  the  economic
downturns  in many Sub-saharan  African  countries.  Important  factors  were
outbreaks of violence (or more exactly,  years of peace), the terms of
trade,  the  diversity  of exports,  whether  the  country  exported  minerals,  the
existence of foreign exchange controls, and a  "habit" parameter that
measures  how imports  respond  to declines  in foreign  exchange. While the
results  presented  below do not include  all of his explanatory  variables,
they  do generally  confirm  the  effects  of  political  instability  and  terms  of
trade  on output  growth. A study  by Kormendi  and  McGuire  (1985)  which  usod
data from both developed and developing economies,  suggest  that other
variables,  such  as the  variability  in money  growth,  the  growth  in  exports,
and the standard deviation of real outpu'.  growth, can also explain
differences  across  countries  in  output  growth  rates.
The  sample  of countries  was selected  by including  all those  which
reported  complete  information  on tax,  output,  and  investment  variables. A
total of 56 observations remained; 27 countries from 1965-73 and 29
countries  from  1974-82.10  This  pooled  cross-section  time-series  data  set
compares  the  growth  experience  of similar  countries  over  time,  and  provides
a larger  number  of observations  than  a simple  cross-section  data set.  For
some coefficients,  such as the marginal  product of capital,  interactive
terms  are introduced  which allow marginal  productivity  to differ  across
periods.
1Q/ In 1965-73,  the countries  were Benin,  Cameroon,  Chad, Congo,  Gabon,
Gambia,  Guinea, Ivory  Coast,  Liberia,  Mali, Nigeria,  Senegal,  Sierra
Leone, Burkina Paso, Botswana, Burundi, Ethiopia,  Kenya, Lesotho,
Madagascar,  Nalawi,  Mauritius,  Rwanda,  Somalia,  Sudan,  Swaziland,  and
Zaire.  In 1974-82, the Gambia, Guinea, Niger, and Zambia were
included,  while  Madagascar  and  Gabon  were  dropped.- 23 -
Table 1 presents  regression  results  for the  model in which taxes
are entered  linearly  rather  than interactively. Column  (1)  describes  an
output  growth  equation  similar  to that  estimated  by Ram (1986). Government
investment  is estimated  to  be highly  productive  during  the  period  1965-73;
its  marginal  productivity  is estimated  to  be a substantial  0.534,  which  is
significant  at the .10 level,  and larger  than the corresponding  marginal
productivity  for  private  investment. However,  the  dummy  variable  for the
period  1974-82  interacted  with public  investmet.  (Public  Investment  74-82)
indicates  a dramatic  fall  in the  productivity  of government  capital  during
this latter period from  .532 to -.077.  By contrast, the marginal
productivity  of private  capital  exhibited  no consistent  change  during  this.
period. 
Column  (2)  provides  a simple  measure  of cumulative  tax  distortions
with the  use  of Tax Effort  which  is interacted  with Private  Investment  and
with  Poulation (this  is  roughly  equivalent  to  assuming  that  rk  - rl). The
predicted effect of a 3 percentage-point  increase  in tax effort is to
reduce output growth by  1/2 percentage points, an estimate which is
significant  at the .05  level. 12
11/  The interpretation  of the  privat  and  public  investment  coefficients  as
"marginal  productivities"  is consistent  with a production  function
model in which output depends, in the long run, on the supply  of
inputs. In a traditional  Keynesian  model,  autonomous  investment  will
be a function  of Y, which reverses  the causal  relationship  posited
above.  I hope to correct  for this reverse  causation  by (i)  using a
nine-year  period,  and (ii)  using  I/Y  to measure  investment,  so that  an
increase  in Y which  causes  an autonomous,  equal  percentage  increase  in
I  will  have  no effect  on the  independent  variable.
12/  The sample  means  of Ig/Y  and  L are  11.5  and  2.7  percent,  respectively.
The effect of a 5 percent increase in tax effort is therefore
5(-.005x11.5+-.048x2.7).  The test of joint significance  of both
coefficients  is significant  at the  0.08 level. While  the taxation  t-
statistics  are insignificant,  they are irrelevant  for testing the
hypothesis  that  taxation  is  important.- 24 -
Recall that ';eightcd  Government Growth measures (G/Y'lG.  Assuming
an average 5.7 percentage point growth rate G, the regression in column (2)
predicts  that  a  per.-,anent  three  percent  increase  in G/Y  financed by
i..¢reasing  the tax effort will reduce output growth rates by 0.3 percentage
points, although this  prediction is not significant at conventional levels.
The  third  column  once  again uses  Tax  Zffort to proxy  for the
overall  degree of tax distortions,  although  in this case it is entered
linearly; as in  (9), rather than interactively.  The coefficient  is
negative  and  significant.
Column  (4)  expands  the  regression  to include  different  measures  of
tax distortion  which are entered  linearly.  One notable aspect  of these
equations is the  significant and negative impact of direct taxation
(corporate  and personal)  on output  growth  rates.  A one percentage  point
increase in the personal tax (equivalent  to a  17 percent increase  in
personal  tax rates) is predicted  to reduce  output  growth  rates by 0.36
percentage  points.  The coefficients  for the import,  export,  and sales
taxes,  however,  are insignificant,  with  coefficients  near  zero.
The  possibility  that  mineral  exporting  countries  (Liberia,  Sierra
Leone, Zaire, Guinea, and Zambia; see Wheeler, 1984) subject to high
corporate tax rates suffered output downturns  because of trade-related
problems  rather  than high corporate  tax rates  was tested  by including  a
mineral  exporting  dummy variable.  The regression  (not reported)  showed
only  minor  differences  in  the  taxation  coefficients.
Landau (1983;  1986)  has suggested  that the ratio of government
consumption  to GDP, G/Y, be entered  as a component  in GDP growth  rates.
While it is difficult  to justify  its  inclusion  on a theoretical  basis (as
discussed  in  the  previous  section),  it  is included  nonetheless  in the  final- 25 -
"portmanteau"  regression  in Table  1.  The coefficient  on G/Y is negative
and significant. One explanation  for this  finding  is that countries  with
higher  levels  of G/Y are  likely  to  have experienced  higher  growth  rates  in
government  spending  during  the  past few decades. The resulting  long-term
reduction  of private  economic  activity  could  have  reduced  subsequent  output
growth.
Table  2 presents regression results when  the tax rates are
interacted  both with capital  accumulation  and with population  (or labor
supply)  growth. The  coefficients  on these  interacted  terms  are  interpreted
as the effect  of a one percentage  point increase  in the tax rate on the
marginal  product  of capital,  or of labor. To begin,  column  (1)  in Table  2
interacts  the tax  rates  only  with the  growth  in capital,  since  population
may be an imperfect proxy for labor supply growth.  The results are
consistent  with the  previous  regressions;  a 1  percentage  point  increase  in
the corporate tax rate (or a  17 percent increase in rates) and a  1
percentage  point increase  in the  personal  tax  rate (or  an 18 percent  hike
in rates)  is predicted  to reduce  the marginal  product  of capital  by 1.0
percentage  point  and 2.4  percentage  points,  respectively.  The  other  taxes
are  insignificant  and  small  in  magnitude.
Whken  the tax  variables  are interacted  with  both capital  and  labor
growth  (column  2), it appears  that the t-statistics  on the corporate  and
personal  tax  are no longer  significant. However,  the test  of whether  the
individual  taxes are significance  is given  by the combined  effect  of a
given  tax  on both labor  and  capital  productivity.  Evaluated  at the  sample
means,  these  linear  combinations  are  significant  and  negative,  indicating,
as above, that the effect  of the corporate  and personal  tax on output
growth  is negative  and significant  at the 0.05 level;  other  tax  measures
are  insignificant.- 26 -
Finally,  the  third  column in Table  2 presents coefficient
estimates  of the  net return  to factor  inputs,  along  thi lines  of equation
(11).  The estimated  effects  of the  different  tax instruments  are similar
to those reported  in column (2).  The coefficient  on the weighted tax
variable  (i)  is  similarly  significant,  and  close  to one  in  value.
As noted  previously,  there  are  two  paths  by which  taxes  can  affect
income  growth.  The first  is through  the  productivity  of inputs,  as the
regressior-a  above  have  been attempting  to measure. The second  is through
the supply  of factors;  higher  tax rates  may reduce  labor  supply  and the
supply  of investment.
A regression  which  explains  private  investment  for the  sample  is
presented  in column  1 of Table  3.  In this  first  regression,  tax  variables
are  excluded;  coups  have a signficant  negative  effect  on investment,  while
oil producing countries tended  to have investment  rates 7.5 percentage
points above non-oil producing countries.  In addition,  the impact  of
government  consumption  (e.g., government  current  expenditures) on
investment  appears  to  be positive  and  significant.
Column (2) includes  the overall  tax effort.  Surprisingly,  the
coefficient  is  positive;  countries  with higher  tax  rates  experience  higher
investment  rates. 13 One  explanation  is that  increased  tax  revenue  scales
back deficits and, by  freeing private savings from government use,
increases  the supply  of funds  for  private  investment  purposes. There  are
two  problems  with this  explanation. The first  is that the  primary  source
of private investment  in Africa is from foreign sources (or retained
earnings  of  partially  foreign-owned  corporations);  domestic  savings  in  most
13/  This  finding  echoes  Koester  and  Kormendi  (1988),  whc  used  a larger  data
set  of 63  countries.- 27-
countries  is not large. The second  problem  with this  explanation  is that
if the supply of investment  funds depended on the difference  between
government expenditures  and tax revenue,  the coefficient  on government
expenditures  (or  consumption)  should  be negative  and  of equal  magnitude  --
which it is not.  Different specifications  of the tax effort  variable
(e.g.,  including  its squared  value) affected  the tax effort  coefficient
only  minimally,  nor does including  both tax  effort  and tax  growth  (column
4) affect  the  strong  positive  impact  of tax  effort  on capital  accumulation.
When both the tax effort, and the individual tax rates, are
included,  the impact  of government  consumption  drops  from  0.386  (in  column
1) to  an  insignificant  0.028,  conditional  on  overall tax effort.
Furthermore,  import  taxes,  export  taxes,  and  corporate  taxes  all  exhibit
strong  negative  effects  on investment  behavior. The  R2 rises  from  .292  to
.559  with the  introduction  of these  tax  variables.
The  corporate  tax  is likely  to reduce  equity  investment  since  the
tax assessed  against  corporate  profits  is often quite substantial  unless
offset  by investment  incentives  and tax holidays.  Similarly,  the export
tax  will reduce  the the  net return  to large-scale  investment  necessary  in
export--oriented  industries;  holding total tax revenue constant,  a 10
percentage  point  increase  in the export  tax is predicted  to reduce  annual
investment  by 30 percent. Assuming  the  marginal  product  of capital  is 12
percent, such an increase in the export tax would (indirectly)  reduce
output  growth  by 0.36  percentage  points.
The  negative  impact  of import  taxation  on investment  suggests  that
investment  is not necessarily  attracted  to c- ntries  which erect tariff
barriers  to protect  iraport-substitution  industries. If existing  import-
substitution industries  have exploited  domestic  markets,  new invetment
might  be directed  towards  projects  which can  be exported  as well.  Hence- 28
high tariffs  on intermediate  and capital  imports  could  discourage  export-
oriented  investment.
Taxes  affect  output  directly  by changing  the  marginal  productivity
of capital  and labor,  and indirectly,  by changing  the supply  of factors.
The combined  effects  may be estimated  using Column (4) in Table 1 (the
direct effect) and Column (3) in Table 3  (the indirect  effect).  The
private  marginal  product  of capital  in 1974-82  from Column (4),  0.12,  is
used to translate the effect of differences  in accumulated  capital  on
output.  For example, the effect of changing the import tax by  one
percentage  point is simply  the direct  effect,  -0.014,  plus the indirect
effect -0.12(0.249),  or -0.04.  Since the average import  tax was 16.1
percent,  a  20  2ercent  increase  (or  a 3.2  percentage  point  increase)  in the
import  tax  would  lead  to  a 0.14  percent  decline  in output  growth. 14 A 20
percent  increase  in the  personal  tax is  predicted  to reduce  output  growth
by 0.41 percentage  points,  a 20 percent  increase  in the  corporate  tax is
estimated  to dampen  output growth  by 0.17 percentage  points,  while the
export tax is expected to cut back output growth by  a  trivial 0.06
percentage  points.  The sales tax is estimated  to have no effect  on GDP
growth  or investment.
These  estimates  can  be used to predict  how output  growth  would  be
affected  by a revenue  neutral  change  in the structure  of taxation. The
effect  c,i  ou±tput  growth of cutting the import, export, personal, and
corporate  tax rates by 20 percent  and replacing  the lost revenue  by the
domestic  sales tax is simply  the measures  calculated  above since output
growth  is  predicted  to  be  unaffected  by  the  sales  or  consumption  tax.  A
revenue  neutral  shift  from  the  personal  tax  to the  sales  tax,  for  example,
is  estimated  to increase  output  growth  by 0.40  percentage  points.
i  The  estimates  are  based  on holding  revenue  (or  tax  effort)  constant.- 29 
A different  question  which can be addressed  with these  data is,
what were the costs of the increased tax effort in African countries
between  1965-73  and 1974-82? Evidence  from  column  (2)  in Table  1 suggests
that the  tax instruments  that  governments  used to increase  tax  effort  lead
to a sharp  decline  in output  growth;  the  direct  effect  of increasing  the
tax effort  by 5 percentage  points  was a 0.9 percentage  point decline  in
output growth rates (5x.187,  from above).  Accounting  for the indirect
positive  effect  of tax  revenue  on investment  attenuates  this  measure  by 0.3
(5x.498  x  .12),  where .498  is the coefficient  from  Column  3, Table 3 and
.12 is the marginal  product  of capital);  hence the total  effect  of the
increased  tax revenue  between 1965-73  and 1974-82  was to reduce output
growth  by 0.6  percentage  points  each year.  Had this revenue  been used to
finance government  investment  projects  during 1965-73,  growth  rates are
predicted  to  have been augmented  substantially.  However,  during  the  later
period 1974-82, the marginal productivity  of government  investment  was
negligible, so a  5 percent increased tax effort to finance public
investment  during  this  period  would  have  reduced  output  growth  rates  by the
same 0.6  percentage  points.  A similar  calculation  reveals  that  using  the
revenue  to finance  government  consumption  during  the  entire  period  1965-82
would  have  led  to a small  decline  in  output  growth  rates.
V.  Conclusion
This paper has presented a  framework for measuring how  the
structure  of taxation  and  government  spending  affect  output  growth. It is
shown that when countries  are not following  a steady-state  growth  path,
static and dynamic tax distortions will affect output growth.  In
particular,  taxes  can  affect  output by  (1) reducing  the marginal
productivity  of capital  and labor,  and (2)  reducing  the supply  of capital
and  labor.- 30  -
Government expenditures also provide positive benefits; tax-
induced  distortions  may  be justified  by the  positive  benefits  of government
programs financed by the additional revenue.  This paper allows this
tradeoff  to be evaluated  by including  both government  spending  and tax
variables  in an  econometric  model  explaining  output  growth.
The  model  was tested  using  31  African  countries  during  the  periods
1965-73  and  1974-82. It  was found  that  the  tax  structure  was an important
determinant  of output  growth;  personal  and  corporate  taxation  reduce  output
growth,  while  import,  export,  and  corporate  taxes  discourage  investment.
Although  the  costs  of tax-financed  government  investment  were justified  by
its  high  marginal  productivity  during  the  period  1965-73,  the  sharp  decline
in marginal productivity  after 1973 suggested  that tax-financed  public
investment  during  1974-82  reduced  output  growth  rates.
The distortionary  costs of taxation  differ  depending  on whether
trade,  indirect,  or direct  taxation  is used.  In particular,  a revenue
neutral  shift  away from  personal,  corporate,  and import  taxes  to domestic
sales  (or  consumption  based)  taxes  is  predicted  to Increase  output  growth.
One difficulty  with this estimation  exercise is the accurate
construction  of the data.  In particular, the effective tax base is
difficult to derive; even if, for example,  corporate  profits  could be
determined,  the  appropriate  corporate  tax  base  would still  be adjusted  by
depreciation  allowances  and  investment  tax  credits. Furthermore,  tax  rates
are  rarely proportional so  that the calculated average ratios may
understate  the  effective  marginal  rate (Koester  and  Kormendi,  1988).
All  studies  explaining  how  government  expenditure  and  tax  policies
"explain"  GDP growth rates suffer  from a potential  endogeneity  problem,
since  government  polinies  themselves  will  be strongly  affected  by economic
conditions. Bolnick (1978)  and Engen  and Skinner  (1988)  have made first- 31 -
steps in the direction  of developing  a simultaneous  model of government
policy,  but  much remains  for  future  research.
This  paper indicates  that  differences  in tax  policy  can explain  a
substantial  degree  of variation  in output  growth  among  African  countries.
While measurement  error and the  potential  for excluded  variables  suggest
that the regression  results  be interpreted  cautiously,  the results  imply
that the structure,  and not simply  the level,  of taxation  can play an
important  role  for  encouraging  growth  in  developing  economies.- 32  -
Iable  1:  GDP  Growth  Regressions,  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  1965-82
[Variable)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Oil  1.684  1.861  1.869  2.238  1.412
(1.41)  (1.61)  (1.68)  (1.80)  (1.22)
Coups  -0.943  -1.016  -1.116  -0.824  -0.769
(1.99)  (2.39)  (2.50)  (1.79)  (1.79)
Private  Investment  1.050  0.213  0.150  0.052  0.137
(0.85)  (0.73)  (1.20)  (0.40)  (1.12)
Priv  Invest  74-82  -0.043  0.037  0.039  0.069  0.104
(0.29)  (0.24)  (0.27)  (0.47)  (0.77)
Public  Investment  0.534  0.744  0.828  0.635  0.862
(1.82)  (2.50)  (2.83)  (2.29)  (3.25)
Public  Inv  74-82  -0.611  -0.653  0.711  0.635  -0.179
(1.88)  (2.07)  (2.33)  (2.06)  (2.60)
Population  0.665  1.651  0.814  0.475  0.342
(1.21)  (1.03)  (1.58)  (0.86)  (0.66)
Terms  of Trade  0.134  0.093  0.090  0.169  0.192
(1.47)  (1.03)  (1.05)  (1.88)  (2.18)
Gov  Growth  x Gov  Share  0.015  0.010  0.010  0.007  0.009
(2.120)  (1.90)  (2.05)  (1.44)  (2.00)
Tax  Effort  (R/Y)  -0.262  -0.117
(2.82)  (1.20)
Tax  Eff.  x Priv.  Inv.  -0.005
(0.31)
Tax  Eff.  x Pop.  Growth  -0.048
(0.61)
Import  Tax  -0.014  -0.011
(0.19)  (0.16)
Export  Tax  -0.010  -0.010
(0.16)  (0.17)
Personal  Tax  -0.357  -0.342
(2.96)  (2.93)
Corporate  Tax  -0.125  -0.135
(2.21)  (2.52)
Sales  Tax  -0.001  0.042
(0.01)  (0.55)
Government  Share  -0.190
(2.67)
1974-82  Interaction  0.672  -0.113  0.060  0.097  0.117
(.36)  (0.06)  (0.34)  (0.05)  (0.06)
Constant  -1.460  -1.674  2.117  3.502  6.311
(.07)  (0.75)  (1.00)  (1.16)  (2.17)
Rt2  0.369  0.412  0.453  0.466  0.572
Not:  Dependent  variable  is average  annual  logarithmic  growth  rate of
GDP. Absolute  value  of t-statistics  in  parentheses.33  -
Table  2:  Interacted  GDP  Growth  Equations,  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  1965-82
(1)  (2)  (3)
Oil  2.534  3.525  3.462
(2.08)  (2.18)  (2.21)
Coups  -0.827  -0.661  -0.662
(1.93)  (1.30)  (1.35)
Private  Investment  0.260  0.519  0.382
(1.75)  (1.11)  (0.83)
Priv.  Invest.  1974-82  0.105  0.086  0.063
(0.74)  (0.53)  (0.40)
Publin  Investment  0.583  0.510  0.228
(2.16)  (1.57)  (0.65)
Public  Invest.  1974-82  -0.617  -0.612  -0.360
(2.04)  (1.81)  (1.01)
Population  0.532  C.128  0.379
(0.94)  (0.06)  (0.20)
Terms  of Trade  0.182  0.207  0.208
(2.13)  (2.20)  (2.28)
Gov  Growth  x Gov  Share  0.718  0.668  0.390
(1.60)  (1.30)  (0.75)
Import  Tax  x Invest  -0.004  -0.020  -0.016
(0.59)  (0.95)  (0.81)
Export  Tax  x Invest  -0.003  0.010  0.009
(0.60)  (0.58)  (0.53)
Personal  Tax  x Invest  0.024  -0.006  0.005
(2.88)  (0.17)  (0.13)
Corporate  Tax  x Invest  -0.010  -0.031  0.023
(2.53)  (1.20)  (0.86)
Sales  Tax  x Invest  -0.000  -0.021  -0.024
(0.01)  (0.74)  (0.84)
Import  Tax  x Pop.  0.054  0.036
(0.68  (0.46)
Export  Tax  x Pop.  -0.068  *-0.055
(0.87)  (0.72)
Personal  Tax  x Pop.  -0.098  -0.128
(0.55)  (0.74)
Corporate  Tax  x Pop.  0.088  0.041
(0.76)  (0.35)
Sales  Tax  x Pop.  0.095  0.125
(0.69)  (0.93)
Tax  rate  x Tax  Growth  0.965
(1.79)
1974-82  Interaction  -0.244  0.100  -0.084
(0.13)  (0.05)  (0.04)
Constant  1.240  0.739  1.127
(0.61)  (0.32)  (0.50)
R2  0.505  0.465  0.469
Note:  The dependent  variable  is the annual  logarithmic  growth  rate in
GDP.  Absolute  values  of t-statistics  are  in  parentheses.34  -
I&bILI:  Private  Investm,ent  Regressions:
Sub-Saharan  Africa,  1965-82
Independent
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Oil  7.468  6.424  4.870  4.549
(4.06)  (3.64)  (2.84)  (2.83)
Coup$  -1.652  -1.019  -0.334  -0.352
(2.12)  (1.33)  (0.47)  (0.53)
Population  1.146  0.712  -0.155  -0.475
(1.22)  0.80)  (0.18)  (0.58)
Terms  of Trade  -0.235  -0.177  0.024  -0.053
(1.56)  (1.24)  (0.17)  (0.39)
Government  Share  0.386  0.256  0.028  0.047
(3.19  (2.08)  (0.24)  (0.41)
Government  Growth  0.132
(1.25)
Tax  Effort  0.381  0.493  0.486
(2.81)  (3.70)  (3.89)
Tax  Growth  0.198
(2.10)
Import  Tax  -0.249  -0.234
(2.43)  (2.44)
Export  Tax  -0.328  -0.309
(3.43)  (3.45)
Personal  Tax  -0.208  -0.052
(1.11)  (0.28)
Corporate  Tax  -0.171  -0.161
(2.00)  (2.00)
Sales  Tax  0.006  0.112
(0.05)  (0.93)
Inflation  0.144  0.213
(1.52)  (2.26)
1974-82  Interaction  0.260  -0.467  -0.883  -1.028
(0.21)  (0.40)  (0.73)  (0M9M)
Constant  1.971  -1.658  10.513  6.519
(0.58)  (0.20)  (2.59)  (1.59)
ft2 0.292  0.379  0.559  0.616
Note:  Dependent variable is the share of private investment  to GDP.
Absolute  value  of t-statistics  in  parentheses.  N - 56.- 35 -
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Appendix: The  Theoretical  Model
This appendix  discusses  in more detail  theoretical  and empirical
aspects  of models  which  measure  the  effect  of government  fiscal  policies  on
output  growth  rates.
1.  Prooerties  of the  OutDut  Growth  Equation  in  the  Neoclassical
Steady  State
Is  the  model  developed  in  the  text  consistent  with  the
neoclassical  growth  model?  First assume that both F and G are linear
homogeneous  in all inputs, including  government  capital and government
expenditures,  a necessary  assumption  for a balanced  growth  path.  Next
consider  a constant  steady-state  growth  rate of population  (or  population.
plus neutral  productivity  growth)  equal to 0.  For the steady-state  to
hold,
AK/K  - AL/L  - AG/G  - AKg/Kg - O  (A.1)
where  the  country  specific  subscripts  are  ignored. because  of linear
homogeneity,
y-  PkK  +  p  1L  +  'ygKg  +  7CG  (A.2)
Dividing  each  side  of (A.2)  by Y,
Y/Y  - _+1L_  +  7K_+7gG  (A.3) AY/Y  - K  _L  Kg  G
Substituting  from (A.1)  - i  (A.2),  it is  apparent  that  AY/Y  - O,  regardless.
of  what r,  and  hence  Ok and  61.  are.39 -
In the  econometric  specification,  it  may appear  that  taxes  affect
output  growth,  even  in the  steady  state. That  is,  rewriting  (A.2),
Y/Y  - Pk[AK/Y]  +  Pl[AL/L]  +  1y(AKg  AY]  +  7c[AG/YI  (A.4)
If  #k and  01 differ  systematically  because  of different  tax  policies,
thvt  the predicted  growth  rate  of output  will also  vary,  depending  on tax
policies  --  even in the steady  state.  The apparent  contradiction  can  be
resolved  by noting that (for example)  AK/Y - [AK/K][K/Y],  which in the
steady  state  is simply  OK/Y.  For a country  with a distortionary  capital
tax, Pk is lower than average.  Since  distortionary  taxation  leads to a
lower  level  of output,  Y in the country  with a distortionary  tax is also
less than average.  Hence for a given  proportional  growth  in capital  6,
AK/Y is  higher  than  average  when  Pk is lower  than  average;  on  net, the  two
effects  cancel  out.  Note that this  problem  does  not arise  in  the  case  of
labor supply, sir.ce  the elasticity is measured.  In some respects,
assumptions  about what is held constant  is motivated  by what data are
available.
In  sum,  the  model  indicates  that  tax  policy  will  have  no effect  on
output  growth  in the  steady  state  when  both  direct  effects  (conditional  on
AK/Y and  AL/Y)  and indirect  effects  (through  differences  in  AK/Y  and  AL/Y)
are  accounted  for.
2.  Agglication  of the  Model  to  Three  or  More Sectors
The extension  to many sectors  is straightforward.  Consider,  for
example, a  third sector, manufacturing, with a production function
M(Km,Lm,Kg,G),  a price  Pm - 1, and there  is a single  output  tax rm;  AK -
AKn +  AKx +  AKM, and equivalently  for labor.  Then the output  growth
equation  is  written  (for  r  - Irk,  rl,Tm)),- 40 -
AY - [F  kuk(r) +  Mk.k(T) +  Hk($tk(r)  k(r)]A K +  (A.5)
[F  1p1 ()  +  1lPl(r)  +  H1 (l-0 1 (r)-4(r))AL  +
[Fi  + MPC  +H]K  [(Fg  + M  + Hg]AG
where  pk(r)  and  pl(T)  are  the  shares  of  capital  and  labor  used  in the
manufacturing  sector. It is straightforward  to extend  this  model  to  derive
the results  presented  in the text;  thus more sectors  does  not change  the
basic  results  of the  simpler  two  period  model.
One complication  that should be mentioned is the presence  of
revenue  from, for example,  an import  tax.  In the context  of the three
period  model  above,  the  import  tax  would  have  two  effects. First,  it  would
provide  revenue  on a tax  base which is not measured  in GDP.  One way to
handle  this  problem  is  to consider  exports  as an "input"  into  the  purchases
of imported  goods. To the  extent  that imports  are  purchased  using  foreign
currency  obtained  from  exports,  a  higher  tax  on imports  simply  implies  that
more  exports  must  be sold  to  purchase  a given  quantity  of imports.
The second  effect  is that  an import  tax  will distort  the  price  of
the  domestic  manufactured  goods  by providing  protection.  Thus if domestic
manufacturing  and imported  manufacturing  were perfect substitutes,  the
import  tax  would  be equivalent  to a subsidy  for  the  manufacturing  sector,
so that an increase in domestic  manufacturing  output  would effectively
reduce  tax  revenue  from  imports.- 41 -
3.  Issues  in the  Measurement  of  Constant  Price  GDP
One difficulty with the estimation of GDP  equations is the
definition  of constant  prices.  In the  example  above,  import  tariffs  lead
to  higher  prices  for tradeable  goods. However,  if the tariffs  had  been in
effect since the price indices  were begun, then the value of domestic
manufacturing  would be overstated,  since they would be valued at the
protected  price  rather  than  the  world (or  potential  import)  price  (Kreuger,
1984).
A related  problem  with the  constant  price  series  is the  manner  in
which changes  in tax rates  are reflected  in the price index.  If income
taxes  are  collected  in  the  taxed  sector,  some  of the  tax  will  be shifted  to
the firm; and in turn some of that tax will ultimately  be shifted  to
consumers. If such  a  price  rise  is  corrected  in the  constant  price  series,
then  the  reRorte price  Px  will  appear  not  to  rise. Hence  the  methods  used
for calculating  constant  price series,  and the extent  to which indirect
taxes are shifted to consumers,  can potentially  affect the estimation
results  in  ways  that  are  difficult  to determine.
Whether  GDP should  be measured  at factor  cost  or at market  prices
is a difficult question.  This paper uses factor cost measures  where
available to follow the convention that factor cost measures output
measured at producer prices,  and not at potentially  arbitrary  consumer
prices  reflecting  any  indirect  tax  rates.- 42 -
4.  The  Data
Table  A.1 provides  a full  print-out  of most of the data used in
this study.  The data on coups  is as follows.  Countries  with one coug in
1965-73: Mali,  Congo,  Somalia,  Sudan,  Ethiopia,  Madagascar,  Burkina  Faso,
Rwanda,  Zaire,  Benin,  Lesotho;  one coup in 1974-82:  Burundi,  Ethiopia,
Liberia,  Congo,  Nigeria;  two coups in 1965-73:  Burundi,  Nigeria,  Ghana,
Sierra  Leone;  two  coups  in 1974-82: Chad,  Burkina  Faso,  Mauritania;  three
coups in 1974-82:  Ghana.  Additional  information  is available  from the
author.- 43 -
Table  A.1:  Data
1965-73
Country  GDP  Priv.  Public  Pop  Terms
Growth  Inv.  Inv.  Growth of Trade
1.  Benin  1.780  11.068  0.872  2.66  -1.72
2.  Cameroon  4.120  10.788  1.472  1.95  -1.40
3.  Chad  -0.030  7.009  0.761  1.98  -0.24
4.  Congo  6.120  19.533  1.607  2.57  -3.03
5.  Gabon  7.140 21.577  5.193  0.69  -0.04
6.  Gambia  5.330  2.800  3.010  3.22  -2.42
7.  Ghana  2.450  5.422  3.338  2.39  2.25
8.  C6te  d'Ivoire  6.650  10.331  4.839  4.69  3.61
9.  Liberia  4.820  11.773  3.457  3.27  -3.03
10.  Mali  2.720  12.307  0.593  2.55  -5.16
11.  Nigeria  7.430  12.999  1.541  2.50  1.80
12.  Senegal  1.190  10.137  0.763  2.38  -2.18
13.  Sierra  Leone  3.280  8.144  2.966  2.36  -3.42
14.  Burkina  Faso  2.870  10.488  0.962  1.99  -5.57
15.  Botswana 14.010 19.291  7.879  2.55  1.01
16.  Burundi  4.590  3.589  1.341  1.85  -1.53
17.  Ethiopia  3.910  8.692  1.558  2.46  -0.05
18.  Kenya  8.370 15.548  2.242  3.62  -0.65
19.  Lesotho  4.440  6.333  4.567  2.23  2.34
20.  Madagascar  2.960  8.627  3.272  2.25  2.45
21.  Malawi  5.570 10.884  4.776  2.87  1.06
22.  Mauritius  2.890  9.735  4.015  1.62  -0.29
23.  Rwanda  5.720  6.017  0.573  2.88  4.10
24.  Somalia  3.420  9.224  1.306  2.83  -2.04
25.  Sudan  -0.700  7.452  2.618  2.45  -8.71
26.  Swaziland  6.810 15.288  4.162  2.73  -0.30
27.  Zaire  4.030  14.001  5.499  2.37  -0.93-44-
Table  A.1 (Continued)
1974-82
Country  GDP  Priv.  Public  Pop  Terms
Growth  Inv.  Inv.  Growth cf  Trade
28.  Benin  4.050  11.111  9.389  2.91  -3.23
29.  Cameroon  6.570  13.316  4.274  2.40  -2.01
30.  Chad  -3.880  7.484  2.416  2.06  -8.86
31.  The  Congo  7.210 20.352  3.258  3.10  -3.52
32.  Gambia  0.530  7.606  8.174  2.49  -1.45
33.  Ghana  -3.010  3.067  2.343  2.90  -5.29
34.  Guinea  2.730  2.630  6.630  2.76  6.21
35.  C6te  dllvoire  5.880  10.644  8.466  4.06  -0.40
36.  Liberia  0.000  15.338  6.542  3.53  -3.11
37.  Mali  5.870  9.418  2.152  2.69  -0.06
38.  Mauritania  2.220  18.115 10.145  2.34  -0.01
39.  Niger  5.690  15.330  4.451  3.20  -0.44
40.  Nigeria  0.700  13.272  6.508  2.72  4.89
41.  Senegal  3.630  12.162  1.898  2.75  -3.18
42.  Sierra  Leone  1.740  4.558  6.642  2.71  -1.11
43.  Burkina  Faso  3.280  15.513  1.367  2.13  -3.90
44.  Botswana  7.560  22.579 10.431  3.63  -3.55
45.  Burundi  4.530  1.132  8.978  2.22  -4.08
46.  Ethiopia  2.250  5.002  2.938  1.87  -3.63
47.  Kenya  3.950  16.726  4.884  4.08  -3.62
48.  Lesotho  4.830  17.647 13.313  2.37  -0.61
49.  Malawi  3.810 14.202  8.128  3.09  -4.13
50.  Mauritius  3.730 18.242  4.618  1.53  -6.32
51.  Rwanda  6.270 11.679  3.371  3.45  -1.75
52.  Somalia  8.870 10.945  7.575  2.80  14.70
53.  Sudan  6.990  9.792  4.318  3.07  -3.14
54.  Swaziland  4.110  15.984  7.556  3.53  -1.57
55.  Zaire  -1.470 15.813  6.427  2.99  8.32
56.  Zambia -0.760 14.676  4.044  3.20  -8.39- 45 -
Table A.1 (Continued)
1965-73
Country  Gov.  Gov.  Tax  Import  Export
Cons.  Growth  Effort  Tax  Tax
1.  Benin  12.300  2.700  12.03  18.12  1.72
2.  Cameroon  8.900  5.020  13.18  24.50  6.65
3.  Chad  17.950  5.700  12.81  14.69  4.44
4.  Congo  19.210  7.100  18.80  12.91  2.79
5.  Gabon  16.670  8.800  19.24  18.48  5.61
6.  Gambia  20.900  2.200  13.14  18.89  3.53
7.  Ghana  12.100  -1.600  14.30  15.53  18.47
8. C6te d'Ivoire 10.100  12.600  20.09  17.46  10.26
9.  Liberia  12.420  3.100  15.54  11.84  0.40
10.  Mali  18.400  -2.500  9.63  11.15  4.87
11.  Nigeria  6.650  12.700  7.89  15.69  2.62
12.  Senegal  17.810  -0.900  16.08  21.61  4.34
13.  Sierra Leone  14.830  4.000  14.44  20.93  3.88
14. Burkina Faso  8.880  7.900  10.98  21.33  2.43
15.  Botswana  21.140  5.700  14.51  14.48  1.97
16.  Burundi  9.420  9;600  10.18  20.05  13.23
17.  Ethiopia  7.980  3.900  9.31  24.96  7.37
18.  Kenya  15.270  11.000  13.93  .13.84  0.26
19.  Lesotho  14.040  4-.000  14.40  13.68  2.86
20.  Madagascar  19.270  2.100  14.74  22.62  5.03
21.  Malawi  15.500  3.800  11.30  12.01  0.00
22.  Maxlritius 11.230  2.500  18.00  12.62  3.28
23.  Rwanda  9.410  2.200  7.93  13.53  13.44
24.  Somalia  14.440  17.100  12.92  23.83  4.12
25.  Sudan  22.330  2.700  16.22  36.02  6.59
26.  Swaziland  14.980  10.000  16.08  10.52  0.09
27.  Zaire  21.880  5.400  25.30  16.35  24.96- 46 -
Table  A.1 (Continued)
1974-82
Country  Gov.  Gov.  Tax  Import Export
Cons.  Growth  Effort  Tax  Tax
28.  Benin  11.830  4.600  17.18  17.00  1.44
29.  Cameroon  8.140  1.070  15.13  18.99  5.90
30.  Chad  18.170 -7.000  12.30  12.97  3.63
31.  The  Congo  16.900  4.500  20.46  8.84  0.35
32.  Gambia 20.940  7.900  13.85  16.06  3.12
33.  Ghana  16.390  9.400  8.33  12.12  22.16
34.  Guinea 16.580  6.000  16.54  22.04  22.83
35.  C6te  d'Ivoire  13.970 11.100  21.31  21.60  7.21
36.  Liberia 12.570  2.700  19.98  10.86  0.18
37.  Mali  20.020  9.000  12.80  7.73  5.70
38.  Mauritania 31.700  7.100  19.69  9.05  1.51
39.  Niger  11.480  2.600  12.96  13.54  3.25
40.  Nigeria 12.070  7.400  19.08  11.31  0.03
41.  Senegal 19.700  7.000  17.44  15.04  1.70
42.  Sierra  Leone  11.180  0.000  16.47  17.89  8.14
43.  Burkina  Faso  14.000 10.500  13.91  15.05  2.70
44.  Botswana 17.640 11.900  23.81  18.80  0.32
45.  Burundi 12.070  5.000  13.19  15.81  15.89
46.  Ethiopia  8.590  3.100  14.35  20.25  18.59
47.  Kenya  20.770  7.000  20.41  11.91  0.42
48.  Lesotho 23.420 13.500  25.71  13.24  1.46
49.  Malawi  15.830  7.900  15.18  8.89  0.00
50.  Mauritius 13.080  6.200  19.82  10.65  5.22
51.  Rwanda  13.150 13.300  10.24  12.09  15.71
52.  Somalia 26.260  3.900  15.04  25.79  1.91
53.  Sudan  15.080  4.800  13.64  26.02  5.46
54.  Swaziland 16.500  4.200  33.70  17.37  6.01
55.  Zaire  22.740  0.500  18.94  10.36  14.67
56.  Zambia 19.550  0.100  23.66  4.95  0.00- 47  -
Table  A.1:  (Continued)
1965-73
Country  Pers.  Corp.  Sales  Tax  Inflation
Tax  Tax  Tax  Growth
1.  Benin  2.55  1.90  4.01  10.20  3.50
2.  Cameroon  6.08  2.26  5.46  4.60  5.44
3.  Chad  5.39  2.13  6.26  2.70  4.67
4.  Congo  5.11  3.78  9.24  3.30  5.26
5.  Gabon  3.92  2.93  4.43  8.60  6.18
6.  Gambia  2.66  1.84  1.10  6.20  2.24
7.  Ghana  4.80  5.60  13.49  -4.30  8.43
8.  C6te  d'Ivoire 5.10  2.09  12.06  7.90  4.25
9.  Liberia  5.92  6.31  5.07  6.90  1.70
10.  Mali  2.49  2.53  11.48  3.20  6.74
11.  Nigeria  0.14  13.83  6.89  23.10  8.61
12.  Senegal  4.88  1.79  8.17  0.30  3.01
13.  Sierra  Leone  5.34  8.31  4.58  7.50  2.22
14.  Burkina  Faso  10.91  1.34  5.29  4.00  2.40
15.  Botswana  0.00  0.00  1.05  29.80  5.00
16.  Burundi  5.18  5.84  8.96  8.90  2.78
17.  Ethiopia  5.07  4.47  11.40  6.10  1.68
18.  Kenya  0.74  12.23  7.80  10.70  2.63
19.  Lesotho  8.51  2.82  1.26  20.60  4.72
20.  Madagascar  4.61  3.67  12.64  4.10  4.26
21.  Malawi  8.72  7.79  5.72  12.20  4.12
22.  Mauritius  8.39  2.73  6.92  -0.50  6.04
23.  Rwanda  5.15  5.94  6.24  3.80  9.97
24.  Somalia  5.71  0.02  12.04  6.70  3.o6
25.  Sudan  2.30  6.56  22.42  2.40  7.35
26.  Swaziland  5.24  4.66  1.18  17.20  4.31
27.  Zaire  9.04  7.00  4.02  7.10  17.14- 48 -
Table  A.1:  (Continued)
19,.  -82
Country  Pers.  Corp.  Sales  Tax  Inflation
Tax  Tax  Tax  Growth
28.  Benin  3.18  3.62  3.72  6.60  10.87
29.  Cameroon  8.77  4.75  8.40  9.80  11.18
30.  Chad  4.79  2.53  3.58  0.10  7.55
31.  The  Congo  5.82  10.71  7.05  0.80  11.86
32.  Gambia  3.78  2.21  0.91  9.40  10.43
33.  Ghana  4.16  4.84  11.43  -9.90  39.46
34.  Guinea  3.69  14.84  4.09  13.10  4.17
35.  C6te  d'Ivoire 4.95  3.18  9.37  5.20  10.68
36.  Liberia  14.41  6.09  6.67  3.80  7.00
37.  Mali  2.96  7.57  9.47  8.10  10.46
38.  Mauritania  10.29  1.77  5.80  7.80  8.72
39.  Niger  4.45  10.17  6.72  14.40  11.64
40.  Nigeria  0.21  48.07  2.13  10.80  11.20
41.  Senegal  5.36  3.25  7.41  2.70  7.48
42.  Sierra  Leone  7.02  11.11  7.59  -1.00  13.27
43.  Burkina  Faso  5.36  2.00  5.23  5.20  10.11
44.  Botswana  0.00  0.00  0.57  12.70  12.90
45.  Burundi  4.94  6.98  11.64  5.10  12.63
46.  Ethiopia  5.18  8.03  13.00  7.10  3.86
47.  Kenya  4.73  10.77  15.16  8.80  10.21
48.  Lesotho  9.78  6.01  0.85  5.10  11.84
49.  Malawi  7.81  11.72  9.32  7.80  9.80
50.  Mauritius  9.77  3.46  4.72  6.00  10.32
51.  Rwanda  2.68  3.74  4.56  8.60  11.02
52.  Somalia  3.77  0.54  8.33  8.40  12.29
53.  Sudan  2.58  7.56  14.71  3.30  15.34
54.  Swaziland  6.84  4.96  1.13  5.80  12.85
55.  Zaire  13.53  7.00  5.66  -5.70  38.24
56.  Zambia  9.84  8.20  17.57  1.50  7.40PPR  Working  Paper  Series
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